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COMMENT
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF QUALIFYING FEES FOR
POLITICAL CANDIDATES
The validity of qualifying fees, the nonpayment of which bars a
candidate from placement on a state primary or general election ballot
or totally from running for public office, has passed into a new context
of judicial scrutiny. The early state decisions involving challenges to
qualifying fees,1 and an occasional case in more recent years,2 turned
for the most part on the integrity of the fee scheme under the enabling
provisions of the state constitution and the reasonableness of the fee.'
Such schemes were often upheld.4
Although particular fee schemes may be both authorized by and
reasonable under state constitutions, broader considerations suggest
that these requirements may be impermissible within our scheme of
government. Because fee schemes burden interests protected by the
Constitution while classifying candidates and voters by means of a
monetary exaction, the fourteenth amendment requires more than
cursory examination of the states' reasons for using such mechanisms
to determine whether their use effects a denial of the equal protection
of the laws guaranteed by that amendment.
Within the past two years the lower federal courts have faced a
number of cases challenging various fee schemes on equal protection
grounds. The resulting split in decision of seven recent district court
1 Challenges were made to both qualifying fees and other aspects of primary laws
soon after their passage. See, e.g., Socialist Party v. Uhl, 155 Cal. 776, 103 P. 181
(1909) ; People ex rel. Breckon v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 221 Ill. 9, 77 N.E.
321 (1906) ; Kelso v. Cook, 184 Ind. 173, 110 N.E. 987 (1916) ; Kenneweg v. County
Comm'rs, 102 Md. 119, 62 A. 249 (1905); State ex rel. Adair v. Drexel, 74 Neb.
776, 105 N.W. 174 (1905); Ballinger v. McLaughlin, 22 S.D. 206, 116 N.W. 70
(1908) ; Ledgerwood v. Pitts, 122 Tenn. 570, 125 S.W. 1036 (1910).
2 Bodner v. Gray, 129 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1961); Munsell v. Hennegan, 182 Md.
15, 31 A.2d 640 (1943); McLean v. Durham County Bd. of Elections, 222 N.C. 6,
21 S.E.2d 842 (1942).
3 See, e.g., McLean v. County Bd. of Elections, 22 N.C. 6, 10, 21 S.E.2d 842,
845 (1942), in which the court concluded:
It is only one of the reasonable means adopted by the Legislature to regulate
primary elections . . . and to prevent an indiscriminate scramble for office
and the wholesale filing of petitions for nomination regardless of fitness or
qualification.
Id. The court did not discuss the relationship between the payment of a fee and
"fitness or qualification."
4 See, e.g., Socialist Party v. Uhl, 155 Cal. 776, 103 P. 181 (1909) ; State ex rel.
Thompson v. Scott, 99 Minn. 145, 108 N.W. 828 (1906). Contra, Johnson v. County
of Grand Forks, 16 N.D. 363, 113 N.W. 1071 (1907).
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determinations - and pending Supreme Court review of one' indicate
the need for analyzing this monetary method of election regulation.
Of the three district court decisions that upheld the qualifying fee
schemes recently attacked-Fowler v. Adams,' Spillers v. Slaughter,'
and Wetherington v. Adams -- the Wetherington decision is repre-
sentative. The plaintiff was a prospective candidate seeking nomination
to the Florida Legislature in a primary election for which appearance on
the ballot was conditioned upon the payment of a $300 fee. Wethering-
ton's argument that the amount of the fee, because of his "lack of
wealth," contravened his constitutional rights was rejected with the
broad language that "as a matter of law . . . the size of the fee is not
such as to raise any constitutional question of intentional or purposeful
" 10discrimination, or of unreasonableness ....
On the issue whether the exaction of any such filing fee was un-
constitutional, the court considered and rejected Wetherington's due
process and equal protection arguments. Although rather summarily
dismissing the due process contention," the court analyzed the equal
protection question rather carefully, determining the purposes of the
fee requirement, the interests protected by the state, and the interests
of those disadvantaged by the fee requirement. The court found the
purposes of the law to be three: "to insure serious political candidates ;"
to limit the number of candidates as an accommodation to the "ma-
chinery set up by the Legislature for the purpose of electing its public
officials ;" and "to provide support, in a monetary form, to political
parties so as to encourage and strengthen them." "2 Concluding that
these purposes involved legitimate state interests to which the fee re-
quirement was "reasonably and rationally related," " and that because
of a statutory write-in provision "an indigent candidate is not dis-
5 Upholding the fees: Spillers v. Slaughter, 325 F. Supp. 550 (M.D. Fla.),
motion for leave to file pet. for writ of mandamus denied, 402 U.S. 971 (1971);
Fowler v. Adams, 315 F. Supp. 592 (M.D. Fla. 1970), appeal dismissed, 400 U.S.
986 (1971) ; Wetherington v. Adams, 309 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Fla. 1970).
Overturning the fees: Carter v. Dies, 321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970),
prob. juris noted, 403 U.S. 904 (1971); Thomas v. Mims, 317 F. Supp. 179 (S.D.
Ala. 1970) ; Georgia Soc. Workers Party v. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga.
1970), aff'd on other grounds sub nom. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S. 431 (1971);
Jenness v. Little, 306 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Ga. 1969), appeal dismissed as moot sub
nom. Matthews v. Little, 397 U.S. 94 (1970). Of the 7, all except Thomas were
decided by 3-judge courts.
The trend appears to be toward overturning the fees, as exemplified by the recent
case, not yet officially reported, Socialist Workers Party v. Welch, 40 U.S.L.W. 2275
(S.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 1971).
6 Carter v. Dies, 321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1971), prob. juris. noted, 403
U.S. 904 (1971).
7315 F. Supp. 592 (M.D. Fla. 1970) (3-judge court).
8325 F. Supp. 550 (M.D. Fla. 1971) (3-judge court).
9309 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Fla. 1970) (3-judge court).
'oId. at 320.
11Id.
32 Id. at 321.
13Id. at 322.
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criminated against unduly," 14 the court held that the fees did not
contravene the equal protection clause.
The four cases that struck down the fees covered the gamut of
political contests. Jenness v. Little -' and Thomas v. Mims ' involved
fees required of candidates in a general election for municipal office;
Carter v. Dies 17 involved a primary for county office; and Georgia
Socialist Workers Party v. Fortson 1s involved a fee requirement for
independent and "third party" candidates in a general election for
governor and United States Representative. While the other cases
invalidated fees for indigent candidates, Carter went further and struck
down the fees for candidates without a showing of indigency if the fee
was an "absolute qualification" for placement on the ballot, or if the fee
was used as a "revenue collecting device." 11
Carter nevertheless illustrates the kind of approach taken in these
four cases.' The fees under attack were required of candidates in
primary elections under a Texas statute authorizing county committees
to apportion election costs among the candidates. Without attempting
to distinguish the Wetherington decision in any meaningful way2- and
refusing to hold that a state could never require a fee,m the court struck
down the fees. Reasoning that this fee scheme encumbered both the
fourteenth amendment right "to choose one's candidate" and the first
amendment right of political association,m the court demanded that the
state show a "compelling state interest" to justify its fee scheme. Re-
jecting as insufficiently compelling the purpose of raising revenue,2 the
14 Id. at 321, 322. It is not entirely clear that the court was correct in thinking
that Florida's write-in provision applies to primary elections. Act of June 1, 1967,
ch. 142, § 1, [1967] Fla. Laws 281 (emphasis added), in force at the time suit was
filed, provided:
(1) Any person seeking election by write-in votes . . . shall have, not less
than thirty days prior to the general election, certified . . . the following
information ....
(3) The department of state shall, not less than twenty days before said
general election, certify the names of such write-in candidates ....
On July 3, 1969, the dates for certification were changed from 30 to 20 days before
the general election to 45 and 30 days before, respectively. See FLA. STAT. ANx.
§99.023 (Supp. 1971).
15306 F. Supp. 925 (N.D. Ga. 1969) (3-judge court), appeal disnissed as moot
sub norm. Matthews v. Little, 397 U.S. 94 (1970).
:16317 F. Supp. 179 (S.D. Ala. 1970).
17 321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (3-judge court).
18315 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1970) (3-judge court).
19 321 F. Supp. at 1362.
20 The 4 cases striking down qualifying fees, of course, manifest differing degrees
of analytic effort. Carter's particularly broad exposition is useful in illustrating the
vast difference in approach between these cases and Wetherington.
2 1 See 321 F. Supp. at 1362-63.
22 Id. at 1362.
2 3 Id. at 1361.
24 Id.
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court quoted from Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections 5
broad language prohibiting state efforts to make the "payment of any
fee an electoral standard," 26 and concluded that the fee requirement was
unconstitutional. 27
This Comment analyzes recent Supreme Court cases delineating,
in the voting context, those interests protected by the Constitution, ex-
amines various kinds of qualifying fee schemes currently employed by
the states, and suggests that under proper constitutional analysis all fee
schemes must fall.
I. FORMULAS AND EQUAL PROTECTION
It has long been recognized that legislation by its very nature
classifies."8  At the same time, the fourteenth amendment's equal pro-
tection clause demands "the protection of equal laws." 29 Courts, faced
with equal protection challenges to state action, have reconciled this
fourteenth amendment requirement with their recognition of the nature
of legislation by demanding that those similarly situated be similarly
treated.3 0
Any candidate qualification requirement by its very nature erects a
-classification "' by which the state either permits or denies prospective
candidates access to either public office or a particular channel to public
office 3 2 Moreover, even if everyone must meet the same requirement
in order to run for office or to enter a certain channel, depending upon
the particular mechanism and the criterion for classification it has
chosen, the state will exclude or disadvantage different groups. Unlike
25 383 U.S. 663, 666 (1966).
26 321 F. Supp. at 1362.
2 7 Id.
28 See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF. L.
REv. 341, 343-44 (1949).
29 Id. 344.
30 Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141, 147 (1940).
31 For a general discussion of classification, see Tussman & tenBroek, supra note
28, at 344-45. While qualifying fee schemes do not expressly prohibit indigents from
becoming candidates, in effect, because the exercise of rights of candidacy is condi-
tioned on a monetary payment, the classification is quite similar to an express pro-
hibition. See Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment,
81 HA v. L. REv. 435, 437 (1967). Although all qualifying fee schemes employ the
same criterion for classifying-payment of a fee--the mechanisms in use vary. As
will be seen, paying the fee may determine whether the candidate may run at all,
whether he may only run as a write-in candidate, whether he receives name placement
on the ballot, and whether he may enter a primary.
32 For the purpose of this analysis, a requirement denies access to public office
when those who do not meet it may not run for office at all. Thus, it is, in effect,
a requirement for holding office. Some qualification requirements, on the other hand,
only apply to particular routes to office. Thus, a fee or a nominating petition require-
ment might be imposed only upon those who enter political primaries or only upon
independents who desire to have their name placed on the general ballot. Write-in




the qualification mechanisms required by some states,3 3 fee schemes
adversely affect those candidates who cannot afford to pay the fee and
those who, despite their ability to pay, are deterred by the fee from
entering the political arena. They are effectively denied an opportunity
that, although offered by the state to all on equal terms, is more difficult
for them than for others, or even impossible for them, to obtain. As a
consequence of requiring fees of prospective candidates, qualifying fee
schemes also classify certain groups of voters: voters who actually prefer
a particular candidate who has qualified and those who would prefer a
particular candidate who has not.
The degree to which candidates and voters are adversely affected
by a fee requirement, however, depends upon the nature of the fee
mechanism a state uses. Some fee schemes permit only those who have
paid a fee to run for office. On the other hand, some qualifying fee
schemes supply a write-in space and, thus, do not completely deny
candidates the chance to run for office and voters the chance to indicate
their preference.' Whether either or both of these arrangements meet
minimum constitutional standards may depend on the degree to which
the former restricts the voter's opportunity effectively to choose a
candidate reasonably reflecting the voter's political views or on the
acceptability of such total candidate disqualification, and, if on either
basis total exclusion is unacceptable, the degree to which the latter
restricts the candidate's chance to try to win and the voter's opportunity
to vote for a candidate who could, with his name printed on the ballot,
expect substantially more support from other voters.
In addition, many fee schemes, by requiring fees for party pri-
maries, also distinguish between those candidates who may qualify for
name placement on the general election ballot. Thus, some candidates
by paying the primary fee will have the chance to win a party label that
they can carry onto the general election ballot with them. This classi-
fication also affects voters, since some will have the chance to vote for
a candidate identified with a particular group while others will not.
State qualifying procedures commonly relegate the nonparty candidates
and their supporters either to an alternative qualification procedure
under which the candidate will appear on the ballot without party
identification as an independent if he qualifies, or to either use of a
write-in space or exclusion from the election.' Under the nonparty
routes to office the candidate may still face some form of fee require-
ment, and the analysis of voter and candidate classification presented
above may still be applicable. In sum, prospective candidates are
typically classified by statute into four groups-party candidates, inde-
3 3 Nominating petition requirements, used exclusively by 15 states, and to some
extent by 47 states, may deny access either to the office or to a particular route to
office; such denial is, however, based on the candidate's lack of support as evidenced
by his inability to gather signatures. See text following note 103 infra.
3 4 See Appendix infra.
3 5 See id.
1971]
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pendent candidates, write-in candidates, and those totally excluded. Fee
schemes are used in a number of states to effect these classifications.
In deciding whether state action unconstitutionally classifies, the
Supreme Court has articulated two essentially distinct tests for deciding
equal protection claimsY6 The traditional test requires upholding state
action in the face of equal protection attack if any "reasonable basis"
for the classification exists to achieve a legitimate state goalY If, how-
ever, the state action affects some "fundamental right" 38--either a
constitutional right" 9 or some other "basic civil right of man" -- or
if the classification is based upon "suspect" criteria,4' the Court will
"carefully and meticulously" scrutinize 2 the state action in search of
the requisite "compelling governmental interests." " In the absence of
such a compelling interest, the state action must fall.
These equal protection formulas, of course, do not automatically
provide an answer to the question whether a given state action is con-
stitutional.' On the other hand, they are more than mere terminology
with which the Court can frame its conclusion. They provide a con-
venient framework within which to focus upon, isolate, and analyze
various important factors of a particular legislative scheme.
This framework is, unfortunately, too convenient, as is also the
sometimes useful characterization of the test as a sliding two-
dimensional scale.4 In its simplicity it provides temptation to subject
36 See, e.g., Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S. 701 (1969) (per curiam) ;
Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) ; Developments in the Law-Equal Pro-
tection, 82 HAnv. L. REv. 1065 (1969).
37 See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970) ; Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry. v.
Ellis, 165 U.S. 150, 155 (1897). For an articulation of this extremely permissive
approach, see McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 809 (1969):
Legislatures are presumed to have acted constitutionally even if source ma-
terials normally resorted to for ascertaining their grounds for action are
otherwise silent, and their statutory classifications will be set aside only if
no grounds can be conceived to justify them.
38 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
39 See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
40 Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
41 See, e.g., Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944) (dictum).
42 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964).
43 Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969).
44 It should be noted, however, that under the "rational relation" test as it has
generally been applied in economic regulation, qualifying fee schemes would probably
be held constitutional. To some extent this traditional test depends upon the purpose
that the state claims its legislation was designed to achieve. If the statute's purpose
is to insure serious or well-supported candidates, rather than to raise money, the
classification will be both underinclusive and overinclusive, since many who can pay
will not be well-supported, while many who cannot pay will be well-supported.
Whether the classification, given such a purpose, will fall depends on a variety of
factors. See Tussman & tenBroek, supra note 28, at 347-53.
On the other hand, if the purpose of a particular qualifying fee is to raise money,
the rational relation test is clearly met. Cf. note 37 supra. The question remains,
however, whether such a classification is constitutional in view of the nature of the
rights involved. Analyzing this second question, this Comment assumes that qualifying
fees do pass the usual rational relation test.
45 See Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, mspra note 36, at 1120-21.
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to rigid classification a multitude of problems requiring variegated
solutions. Indeed, precisely in the area of voting rights and the op-
eration of election machinery this framework now shows signs of
crumbling. Perhaps the most articulate formulation given this fact by
a member of the Court came from Justice Marshall, who supported his
formulation, albeit in a welfare case dissent, with citations to two of
the major cases in the voting rights area:
In my view, equal protection analysis of this case is not
appreciably advanced by the a priori definition of a "right,"
fundamental or otherwise. Rather, concentration must be
placed upon the character of the classification in question, the
relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated
against of the governmental benefits that they do not receive,
and the asserted state interests in support of the classification.
As we said only recently, "In determining whether or not a
state law violates the Equal Protection Clause, we must con-
sider the facts and circumstances behind the law, the interests
which the State claims to be protecting, and the interests of
those who are disadvantaged by the classification." Kramer
v. Union School District, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969), quoting
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). 4
To this analysis other factors worthy of weight might be added. For
present purposes it suffices to point out that the interests of a class may
be "fundamental" because they are, or further, interests that our system
of government should foster for its own good. A court evaluating equal
protection claims should engage in a visible balancing of interests, very
carefully evaluating the importance of each interest. This should ensure
the best possible result and the exclusion of frequently overlapping sub-
jective elements of decision.
Parsing the elements worthy of concern in testing the constitution-
ality of qualifying fees, this Comment will focus upon those factors that
merit weight in such an analysis either because the Court has accorded
them weight in recent opinions or because they appear particularly
significant in terms of the political realities of American democracy.
The following section will trace the Court's recent decisions in-
volving candidates, voting, and political parties, and will attempt to
identify the interests the Court has perceived as particularly worthy of
protection under the equal protection clause. The final section will
examine the common state qualifying schemes incorporating fee re-
quirements and apply the lessons of the decisional analysis to the struc-
ture and realities of those schemes when viewed against the background
of the alternatives available to serve the legitimate ends states seek to
achieve.
46 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 520-21 (1970) (footnotes omitted).
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II. CANDIDATES, VOTERS, AND POLITICAL PARTIES:
THE IDENTIFICATION OF PROTECTED INTERESTS
A. Protecting Candidates for Elective Office
Although the Supreme Court has never recognized a consti-
tutional right to be considered for elective public office and has left to
the states the determination whether a particular office will be appointive
or elective, once that determination has been made, the Court has held
that in being considered for that office an individual is entitled to the
equal protection of the law. In Turner v. Fouche 4' the Court struck
down a Georgia law limiting appointive school board membership to
freeholders as a violation of the fourteenth amendment. It found it
unnecessary to decide whether a compelling state interest must be
shown to justify restrictions on qualification for office.4 But as to the
freeholder requirement, the Court expressly rejected any claim that a
citizen "must . . .own real property if he is to participate responsibly
in education decisions" " and added that lack of ownership does not
establish "a lack of attachment to the community and its educational
values." "I Despite the Court's assertion that "it seems impossible to
discern any interest the qualification can serve," " its rationale imposes
a far more stringent test than a requirement that a state's action have
some conceivable rational relation to a legitimate end it seeks. Turner
makes clear that the rational relationship needed to justify restricting
consideration for public office, while perhaps not the same as the "com-
pelling state interest" sometimes required for legislative classifications,
is something quite different from the rational relationship that the
Court will accept when less important interests are involved.52 At the
least, Turner demonstrates that when consideration for public office is
47396 U.S. 346 (1970).
4 8 Id. at 362.
49 Id. at 363-64.
50 Id. at 364 (emphasis added).
51 Id, at 363. Georgia, apparently attempting to show that its freeholder require-
ment was rationally related to several state goals, urged (1) that ownership of real
estate leads to responsible participation in educational decisions, and (2) that "the
lack of ownership of realty establish[es] a lack of attachment to the community and its
educational values." Id. at 363-64. Similarly, Justice Harlan attempted in his
Harper dissent to demonstrate a rational relationship between voting and the poll tax:
[lit is certainly a rational argument that payment of some minimal poll tax
promotes civic responsibility, weeding out those who do not care enough about
public affairs to pay $1.50 . . . . It is also arguable . . . that people with
some property have a deeper stake in community affairs, and are consequently
more responsible, more educated, more knowledgeable, more worthy of con-
fidence, than those without means ....
383 U.S. at 684-85.
52 Cf. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 508-30 (1970) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). Compare, e.g., Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970) ; Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Hlections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) ; Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) ;
Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535 (1942); with, e.g., McGowan
v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Metropolis Theater Co. v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61
(1913) ; Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
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involved, the Court will not tolerate the evils of an overinclusive
classification:
Whatever objectives Georgia seeks to obtain by its "free-
holder" requirement must be secured, in this instance at least,
by means more finely tailored to achieve the desired goal.53
Although Turner spoke in the context of an appointive office, its
holding must be carefully examined if lessons for the protection of
candidates for elective office are to be sought. The Court's words were:
[T]he appellants and the members of their class do have a
federal constitutional right to be considered for public service
without the burden of invidiously discriminatory disqualifica-
tions. The State may not deny to some the privilege of hold-
ing public office that it extends to others on the basis of dis-
tinctions that violate federal constitutional guarantees."
Thus, under Turner, a state qualification scheme that imposes
upon every channel to an elective office a condition lacking some sub-
stantial justification will fail to satisfy the requirements of the four-
teenth amendment simply because it effects an invidious discrimination
among candidates. In such a case the state has made failure to meet
the condition a disqualification from holding public office.
When, however, the state has left one channel to office, among
several, free of the forbidden requirement, the problem becomes more
complicated-and this may be true no matter how meager that channel
is. In such a case, the state has made the fee not a requirement for
holding office, but a requirement for a particular way of running for
that office. One might attempt to extrapolate from Turner the sug-
gestion that because the state classifies candidates, once they are given
the chance to run, into party candidates, independent candidates, and
write-in candidates, it must make that classification as well upon
grounds unrelated to payment of a fee unless it can show sufficient
justification under the Turner approach. This attempt, however,
assumes too much.
The candidate may, when others are given the chance to garner
votes at a general election, only have a right to the same opportunity
through a procedure "more finely tailored" to office qualification than
is a fee scheme. But if he wishes more than this minimal opportunity,
limits on the state's power to impose restrictions, including fee require-
53 396 U.S. at 364. The similarity between a fee requirement and a freeholder
requirement consists in their overinclusive and underinclusive elements. See note 100
infra. When important interests are adversely affected, the state should be required
to choose a "more finely tailored" criterion, assuming it may constitutionally classify
at all. Cf. Socialist Workers Party v. Welch, 40 U.S.L.W. 2275 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 27,
1971).
54Id. at 362-63 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
19711
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ments, limiting that opportunity, are less clear. It does not follow from
Turner that because the state has failed to justify a fee for allowing a
candidate any access to the electorate, it cannot justify by a lesser show-
ing the requirement that the candidate pay a fee for the additional oppor-
tunity to attempt to have his name, or both his name and that of an
endorsing political party, printed on the ballot. In other words, Turner
may stand for no more than the principle that a state may not distribute
the chance to run for office on the basis of wealth.
Thus, in the context of elective office, should a court feel that, by
providing one channel through which candidates may qualify to garner
votes at a general election free of unconstitutionally discriminatory
conditions, the state has left unburdened the only right worthy of the
rather strong protection accorded by the Supreme Court in Turner-
that is, the right to be considered for public office on a nondiscrim-
inatory basis--even a write-in space might be sufficient to satisfy the
constitutional mandate.
Such a holding would be shortsighted. The intricacies of the
American electoral system are quite different from the mechanics of an
appointive system. And the usual state political process is lacking in
simplicity and openness, a fact courts should take into account. As we
shall see, the interests to be protected, when voting, rather than appoint-
ment, determines the officeholder, extend beyond those of the candidate,
and state election machinery typically provides more than one way to
gain access to the electorate. The Supreme Court has protected these
other interests as well, and protected them assiduously. Thus, before
examining the intricacies of state election machinery to determine
whether fee schemes meet the requirements of the fourteenth amendment,
it is necessary to examine those opinions to determine the fundamental
interests they protect, and to explicate the efforts to which the Court
is prepared to put the states in respecting those interests.
B. Protecting the Right to Vote
The requirement that a person pay either for a benefit supplied by
the state or for permission from the state to engage in certain activity is,
of itself, rather commonplace. Requiring payments for the privileges
of operating a liquor store or driving a car on the state's highways does
not, without more, require more justification than a showing that the
particular requirement bears a rational relationship to some legitimate
state interest.
In the voting context, however, the Supreme Court has explicitly
forbidden the states from placing a price on the exercise of the franchise.
In Harper v. Virginia State Board of Elections,5 the Court found that a
general poll tax of at most $1.50, combined with the sanction of dis-
enfranchisement for failure to pay, created a classification whereby "the
affluence of the voter or payment of any fee" became "an electoral
55 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
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standard," " and held this requirement "invidious discrimination"
contravening the equal protection clause. Refusing to discuss in depth
the constitutional basis for the "right to vote" in state elections or the
nature of the state's power to restrict the franchise, the Court ruled
that
once the franchise is granted to the electorate, lines may not be
drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
With respect to the principle or formula that the Court used in
striking down the poll tax, Harper has been called a "symphony of
holdings." " At one point in the opinion the Court seems to say that
the poll tax has no rational relation to any legitimate state goal:
"Voter qualifications have no relation to wealth nor to paying or not
paying this or any other tax." " Yet at the end of the opinion, this
approach becomes mixed with another theory:
We have long been mindful that where fundamental
rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection
Clause, classifications which might invade or restrain them
must be closely scrutinized and carefully confined ...
Those principles apply here. For to repeat, wealth or
fee paying has, in our view, no relation to voting qualifica-
tions; the right to vote is too precious, too fundamental to
be so burdened or conditioned."
In light of both the ease with which Justice Harlan in dissent
established that "arguments have been and still can be made in favor
of" property qualifications " and discussions of the Harper principle
in later Court decisions, 2 the case obviously stands for more than the
principle that poll taxes have no rational basis. Instead, besides re-
flecting the Court's concern that the poor not be denied the access to
the vote available to the rich, Harper must be taken at its word that
such wealth classifications "must be closely scrutinized and carefully
confined." 3
Far from being an unprecedented holding, this proscription merely
began to give voice to the broad intimations in Justice Stone's famous
footnote four of United States v. Carolene Products Co. : 64
56 Id. at 666.
57Id. at 665.
5s Michelman, On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83
HPAv. L. !Ev. 7, 25 (1969).
59 383 U.S. at 666.
60 Id. at 670 (citations omitted).
61 Id. at 684-85 (Harlan, J., dissenting) ; see note 51 supra.
02 See, e.g., McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs, 394 U.S. 802, 807 (1969).
63 383 U.S. at 670.
64304 U.S. 144 (1938).
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It is unnecessary to consider now whether legislation
which restricts those political processes which can ordinarily
be expected to bring about repeal of undesirable legislation, is
to be subjected to more exacting judicial scrutiny under the
general prohibitions of the Fourteenth Amendment than are
most other types of legislation. 5
And, although the Court's opinion in Harper did not cite the Carolene
Products footnote, it did quote language from Reynolds v. Sims,"' a re-
apportionment case, to the same effect:
Undoubtedly, the right of suffrage is a fundamental
matter in a free and democratic society. Especially since the
right to exercise the franchise in a free and unimpaired manner
is preservative of other basic civil and political rights, any
alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote must be
carefully and meticuously scrutinized.
67
Harper thus recognized that one man's vote is important primarily
because it is part of a political force with the potential power to deter-
mine the legislative policies governing his life. Thus viewed, Harper
banned the poll tax because it disenfranchised a class of citizens by
means of a monetary exaction and so rendered that class powerless to
remove, by voting, the very restriction that disenfranchised them.
This is not to say that one man's vote of itself is unimportant. True,
the right to vote in many ways is an individual right fortifying the
dignity of a citizen and bolstering his sense of political participation.
The importance of one man's vote, however, lies primarily in its
potential for combining with that of others to effect change.
While only indigents are clearly excluded by a poll tax they cannot
afford to pay, Harper struck down the tax for all residents, those who
could afford to pay as well as those who could not." The Court, thus,
65 Id. at 152 n.4. This same notion and the Supreme Court's resolution of the
general problem were well stated recently in Kramer v. Union Free School Dist.,
395 U.S. 621 (1969):
The presumption of constitutionality and the approval given "rational" clas-
sifications in other types of enactments are based on an assumption that the
institutions of state government are structured so as to represent fairly all
the people. However, when the challenge to the statute is in effect a chal-
lenge of this basic assumption, the assumption can no longer serve as the
basis for presuming constitutionality.
Id. at 628 (footnotes omitted).
66377 U.S. 533 (1964).
67 383 U.S. at 667 (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561-62 (1964)).
68 Both the outlines of this larger injured class and the general principle by
which it was protected are, perhaps, more clear if the poll tax is hypothetically set
at $50 instead of $1.50. Thus, the "injured" class includes not only indigents but
also those voters able to pay the $50 fee who are, nevertheless, deterred from voting
by the tax alone. While often such a tax provides only an excuse to an already
disinterested voter, many of these deterred voters would fail to vote because, upon
measuring the "present value" of their vote, so to speak, in terms of its power to
QUALIFYING FEES
decided that the poll tax places an impermissible burden even upon those
voters to whom the tax itself was insignificant. If one would look for
a reason he might do worse than to return to the Carolene Products
rationale. Such a tax does not merely skew the class of voters toward
the more wealthy-it invites each voter to weigh the value of his vote,
and, if he is human, he is likely to weigh it in terms of its return to him,
failing to consider or, at least undervaluing, the importance to society
of an open political system responsive to his and others' wishes.
To be sure, Harper on its facts speaks only to state action that
conditions upon the payment of a fee the casting of one's vote in any
manner, just as Turner speaks to the opportunity to be considered for
public office in any manner. The decision does not compel a result in
the case of a qualifying fee scheme in which a voter is free to proceed
to the voting booth and cast his ballot, but finds that his candidate has
been either disqualified from running or relegated to write-in or inde-
pendent status that will make it difficult or impossible for that candidate
to attract a concentration of votes sufficient to gain office and for the
voter to vote for or help to elect him. Going a step further, while
a state may not require a citizen to pay for his vote, it does not neces-
sarily follow from this that a state may not, consistent with the equal
protection clause, require candidates to pay for their places on the
ballot.
But although Harper does not reach the relationship between the
right to vote and the opportunity to have the candidate of one's choice
appear on the ballot, clearly the right to vote in any manner, guaranteed
against monetary disincentives by Harper, means little in practical
terms if it does not include the possibility of voting with some effect.
One must assume that the Court was aware that to fulfill its purpose
the right to vote, when given by the state at all, must guarantee more
than merely the right to cast a ballot.
C. The Nexus Between Voting and Candidacy
Williams v. Rhodes, 9 decided two years after Harper in a "hastily
reached, divided, and potentially far-reaching decision," 7 provides
clues to the proper relationship between the protections afforded the
effect desirable change, against the $50 tax, they would find in the $50 saved a
greater benefit. Such a person will simply not waste his money voting. Further, if
many people similarly situated perform the same calculus of balancing marginal
utilities, they will all refrain from voting, even if, in fact, collectively they could have
changed the result of the election. Because of unperfeet information, people simply
do not realize how important in practical terms their vote really is.
Thus, upon this analysis, the Court in Harper realized that because one man's
vote is valuable in terms of power only when combined with the votes of others of
similar persuasion, any voter tends to "undervalue" the worth of his vote. The Court
apparently did not want this voter to engage in a utilitarian calculus with his vote.
69 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
7oG GUNTHER & N. DOWLNG, CASES AND MATERIALS oiy CoxsrrruiolAL LAw
1016 (8th ed. 1970); see Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 63-70 (1968) (Warren,
C.J., dissenting).
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right to vote in Harper and state restrictions on candidacy. The re-
straints attacked in Williams were not qualifying fees, but the intricate
mechanism by which Ohio through its election laws
made it virtually impossible for a new political party, even
though it has hundreds of thousands of members, or an old
party, which has a very small number of members, to be placed
on the state ballot [for presidential electors] .7'
Under Ohio law, in presidential elections, political party conven-
tions nominated slates of electors, rather than candidates, to appear on
general election ballots. While electors could be selected only by
political parties, voters voted for these electors at the general election
rather than for the particular parties that had selected them." In addi-
tion, the state placed nearly insurmountable obstacles in front of political
parties that had failed to poll at least ten percent of the votes cast in the
previous gubernatorial election-in effect, all parties except the Demo-
cratic and the Republican. Finally, these disfavored parties were
required not only to maintain an organization of substantial com-
plexity, but also to collect by February of the election year a number of
signatures equaling fifteen percent of the votes cast in the previous
gubernatorial election. Failing to meet all of the requirements, a
party's nominated electors were foreclosed from the ballot.
Rejecting the state's argument that under article II, section 1 of
the Constitution the state had absolute power to put restraints on the
selection of electors,73 the Court held that "no State can pass a law
regulating elections that violates the Fourteenth Amendment's com-
mand .... ," 7 The Court then concluded that Ohio's laws had that
effect:
[T]he state laws place burdens on two different, although
overlapping, kinds of rights-the right of individuals to asso-
ciate for the advancement of political beliefs, and the right of
qualified voters, regardless of their political persuasion, to
cast their votes effectively 5
Requiring, but failing to discern, a "compelling interest," the Court
struck down the restrictive election laws.7"
71393 U.S. at 24.
72 OHIO Rav. COD ANN. §3513.11 (Page 1960); see State ex rel. Beck v.
Hummel, 150 Ohio 127, 80 N.E.2d 899 (1948).
73 393 U.S. at 28-29.
74Id. at 29.
75Id. at 30.
76 Id. at 31. The Court, modifying the district court's judgment ordering the
state to provide write-in space for both parties, required the state to maintain on the
ballot the name of the American Independent Party (AIP), placed there pursuant
to an interlocutory order of Justice Stewart in his capacity as Circuit Justice. The
Court, however, did not require the state to place the Socialist Labor Party's (SLP's)
name on the ballot, because that party had not made timely application to Circuit
Justice Stewart and because the Court felt that forcing the state to place the SLP
on the ballot would disrupt the election process. Id. at 34-35.
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Williams is significant, first, because it recognized explicitly a
right to vote "effectively" and required the state to show a compelling
interest to justify its onerous scheme. The Ohio laws, like those in
Harper, did not place a direct burden on the right to cast a ballot.
Thus, voters could still go to the polling place and vote. But the Court
recognized that the right to vote entails more than merely the chance
to cast a ballot. To protect the right to vote, the Court perceived that
it must restrict the power of the state to limit candidate access to the
ballot on the basis of identification with a particular political association
or group.
The right to form a party for the advancement of political
goals means little if a party can be kept off the election ballot
and thus denied an equal opportunity to win votes. So also,
the right to vote is heavily burdened if that vote may be cast
only for one of two parties at a time when other parties are
clamoring for a place on the ballot.77
This rationale merely gives further effect to the principle of political
openness that was the basis for Justice Stone's Carolene Products foot-
note and that served as the premise for, and was protected, at least to
some extent, by Harper. Thus, Justice Stone intimated that restrictions
on the political process should require greater justification than restric-
tions on less important interests, and Harper assumed that the vote,
which it was protecting from monetary disincentives, was a right worth
protecting. Williams, making Harper's premise true, made the right
to vote worth something by translating it into a right to vote effectively.
Thus, in Williams the point had been passed beyond which a
state's restriction of ballot placement makes virtually meaningless the
right to vote and the right to associate. Williams does not say, how-
ever, that all restrictions on ballot placement are unconstitutional re-
gardless of the particular makeup of the entire electoral procedure. In
fact, recently in enness v. Fortson,78 involving an appeal from the
Georgia Socialist Workers case,7 9 the Supreme Court upheld a
nominating petition requirement that the state imposed only on inde-
pendents and minor party nominees.
Under Georgia law, political organizations whose candidate re-
ceived at least twenty percent of the vote at the previous gubernatorial
or presidential election were guaranteed ballot placement for their
primary winner. On the other hand, independents and nominees of
organizations that had not previously polled twenty percent could gain
771d. at 31.
78 403 U.S. 431 (1971).
79 Georgia Soc. Workers Party v. Fortson, 315 F. Supp. 1035 (N.D. Ga. 1970)
(3-judge court). No appeal was taken from the district court's ruling that Georgia s
filing fee requirement violated the equal protection clause. See Jenness v. Foitson,
403 U.S. 431, 432 (1971).
124 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol.120:109
ballot placement only by filing a nominating petition signed by at least
five percent of those eligible to vote at the last election. Certain
prospective candidates, registered voters, and political parties brought
suit claiming violations of the first and fourteenth amendments.'
On the first amendment claim, the Court examined the electoral
procedure as a whole and, distinguishing Williams, upheld Georgia's
nominating petition scheme.
Unlike Ohio, Georgia freely provides for write-in votes. Un-
like Ohio, Georgia does not require every candidate to be the
nominee of a political party, but fully recognizes independent
candidacies. Unlike Ohio, Georgia does not fix an unrea-
sonably early filing deadline for candidates not endorsed by
established parties. Unlike Ohio, Georgia does not impose
upon a small party or a new party the Procrustean require-
ment of establishing elaborate primary election machinery.81
Thus, unlike Ohio, which had clearly burdened the right to associate,
Georgia permitted the kind of openness under which small and new
groups could easily form and flourish. "In a word, Georgia in no way
freezes the status quo, but implicitly recognizes the potential fluidity
of American political life." '
The Court handled the equal protection claim on two levels. First,
it held that requiring independents and minor party nominees to present
a five percent nominating petition, while requiring a prospective major
party candidate only to win the party primary, did not violate the equal
protection clause, because neither of these routes to the ballot could be
assumed to be "inherently more burdensome" than the other."
On a different level, the Court faced the claim that Georgia
violated the equal protection clause by guaranteeing to major parties,
although to no particular candidate, a ballot position, while giving to
minor parties, required to present a nominating petition, no such
guarantee. 4  To this party, as opposed to candidate, claim, the Court
answered only that
there are obvious differences in kind between the needs and
potentials of a political party with historically established
broad support, on the one hand, and a new or small political
organization on the other.85
80 Although it had been one of the plaintiffs in the district court, the Georgia
Socialist Workers Party was not an appellant. Nevertheless, the Court assumed
that the individual appellants "can properly assert the interests of that 'political body.'"
403 U.S. at 441 n.26.
81 Id. at 438.
82 Id. at 439.




Without analyzing these differences, the Court simply concluded that
"[s] ometimes the grossest discrimination can lie in treating things that
are different as though they were exactly alike .. 8 . 6
While to some extent Jenness qualifies Williams by demonstrating
that not all restrictions on ballot placement are unconstitutional, it does
not question the basic holding of Williams that the right to vote effec-
tively and freedom of association, in the voting context, are constitu-
tionally protected interests. Although involving a repressive law '7 and
highly visible classes of "injured" voters,"' in the thrust of the opinion,
Williams is directly applicable to fee schemes, which also burden the
right to vote effectively and the right to associate. Jenness only reveals
that the constitutionality of burdens actually imposed on these rights
depends a great deal on the nature of the state's election scheme as a
whole.
Moreover, a qualifying fee scheme differs from a nominating peti-
tion requirement with respect to the classification it erects. Both re-
quirements deny to some prospective candidates a place on the ballot.
Thus, both limit the voter's choice. Qualifying fees, however, limit
ballot placement to those who can afford its price, while the nominating
petition provides ballot placement only to those who have demonstrated
sufficient voter support. Since there is no indication that voters desire
to choose only from among those who can afford to pay a fee and
because it is reasonable to believe that some voters may desire to vote
for those who cannot afford to pay the price, a fee requirement does
not take into account the right to vote effectively. On the other hand,
those who fail to obtain a sufficient number of signatures and thereby
to demonstrate their support, can complain of little more than having
been denied the opportunity to lose.
None of the four major cases discussed-Turner, Harper, Wil-
liams, and Jenness-provides an easy solution to the constitutionality
of qualifying fee schemes. To a great extent, this is because there is no
one fee scheme. Instead, the states employ various kinds of schemes,
each of which may require a different analysis. Thus, some require the
payment of a fee as an absolute condition for running for office, while
others impose fees only upon candidates who have chosen a particular
way to run. These cases do suggest, however, the considerations that
any constitutional analysis of the problem must take into account.
86 Id. at 442.
87 In Williams the election law was especially repressive. First, Ohio permitted
the Republican and Democratic parties to reach the ballot, since each had polled at
least 10% of the votes cast at the last election, but required third parties to file
petitions with the signatures of 15% of the votes cast at the previous election.
Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 25-26 (1968). Secondly, the state eliminated
independent candidacy, by requiring that nominees be endorsed by a political party,
and abolished write-in votes entirely. Id. at 35-36 (separate opinion of Douglas, J.).
88 Both the AIP and the SLP were composed of voters who had already taken
the initial step of banding together with others of similar persuasion to form a
recognizable political organization.
126 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
Turner suggests requiring a state to demonstrate a compelling
interest-something more than a rational relationship-to justify con-
ditioning altogether the right to run for public office upon payment of
a monetary fee. Some fee schemes do, in fact, so condition access to
the electorate. The constitutionality of such schemes depends upon the
interests alleged by the state to justify imposing such an absolute fee.
Harper and Williams, read together, suggest that the constitu-
tional protections afforded the right to vote require at least some
restrictions on the power of the states to limit candidacy.
Consideration of Williams and Jenness together suggests that
while the state may not give a virtual ballot monopoly to particular
parties, and by analogy to particular candidates, it does have legitimate
interests that justify, in some circumstances, restricting access to the
electorate altogether and, in other circumstances, giving preferential
treatment to large, well-established parties. To some extent the con-
stitutionality of the state's scheme depends upon the criterion by which
the state classifies and upon consideration of the extent to which
protected interests are being burdened. One must also examine, how-
ever, with respect to those schemes that burden only certain routes of
access to the electorate, the degree of difficulty different routes to
political office require a particular candidate to face.
III. QUALIFYING MECHANISMS: OF ENDS,
MEANS, AND ALTERNATIVES
Having examined the constitutional protection accorded the in-
terests of candidates and voters, this analysis must also take into account
the states' legitimate interests in restricting access to the electorate. A
brief catalogue of the interests advanced by the states to support fee
schemes will suffice at this point because the common question raised in
recent cases s9 has been not the legitimacy of the state's asserted in-
terests, but the degree of infringement on protected interests wrought
by the mechanism chosen to achieve these ends. Assuming the infringe-
ment of fundamental rights and the legitimacy of the state's interests,
the question becomes whether excluding nonqualifying, prospective
candidates is "'necessary to promote a compelling state interest." 90
The district court in Wetherington v. Adams 91 isolated three pur-
poses of the qualifying fees attacked in that case: to insure "serious"
political candidates, to accommodate the state's election machinery by
limiting the number of candidates, and to provide monetary support to
political parties.92 An additional purpose, discussed and held not com-
89 See cases cited note 5 supra.
90 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969) (emphasis
added); see Socialist Workers Party v. Welch, 40 U.S.L.W. 2275 (S.D. Tex. Oct.
27, 1971).
91309 F. Supp. 318 (N.D. Fla. 1970) (3-judge court).
92 Id. at 321.
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pelling in Carter v. Dies, 3 is to help defray the cost of conducting the
particular election. Whether these interests justify a scheme of
qualifying fees depends upon the necessity of excluding prospective
candidates who cannot pay fees to achieve the particular goal,94 the
determination of which requires in turn application of the principle that
a state's interest in employing a particular means to achieve a particular
goal cannot be compelling or necessary if there exists a viable but less
burdensome method to reach substantially the same results. 5
Our examination must be made within a complex framework of
variation. Constitutional analysis of fee schemes must take into account
the various kinds of classifications that the state's qualification procedure
erects. Thus, some prospective candidates will be given name placement
on the ballot, while others will either have to rely on write-in votes or
be excluded totally from voter consideration. In addition, candidates
whose names appear on the ballot are visibly classified: some, endorsed
by political parties, will carry the party label onto the ballot, while others
will run only as independents.
Recognizing the importance of political endorsement and name
placement on the ballot does not reflect condemnation; rather it sug-
gests that analysis must account for the realities of American politics.
Thus, because to a great extent American politics is party politics, the
great advantage that party endorsement provides must be given candid
recognition in constitutional analysis. Similarly, recognizing the im-
portance of the printed name rests on a related, though more general
phenomenon-the inherent difficulty in winning as, and voting as part
of a movement for, a write-in candidate. Constitutional analysis must
not blind itself to these two realities.
The following analysis, accordingly, will treat these three statuses-
party candidate, independent, and write-in candidate-as different.
First, those schemes in which payment of a fee is required of every
prospective candidate will be considered and compared with other
qualifying schemes available to, and already used by many, states. The
analysis will then shift to examine those schemes in which payment of
a fee is required for name placement on the ballot, but in which a
write-in space is provided, to determine whether such an alternative
route to office excuses fee requirements. Finally, the analysis will
focus upon those fee schemes in which fees are required only of those
prospective candidates desiring to run in a party primary to determine
whether the presence of alternative routes to name placement on the
general ballot not encumbered by fees will save the scheme.
93 321 F. Supp. 1358, 1361 (N.D. Tex. 1970) (3-judge court).
94 Kramer v. Union Free School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969).
95 See Wormuth & Mirkin, The Doctrine of the Reasonable Alternative, 9 UTAH
L. REV. 254 (1964); Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, supra note 36, at
1102 & n.154; Note, Discriminations Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment,
81 HARv. L. Rv. 435, 442 (1967) ; cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960) ;
Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960). See also Struve, The Less-Restrictive-
Alternative Principle and Economic Due Process, 80 HA.xv. L. REv. 1463 (1967).
1971l
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A. Absolute Fee Requirement for Chance to Run for Office
Thirteen states require that both independent and party primary
candidates pay a fee for placement on the ballot. 6 Of these, eleven
provide a write-in mechanism as an alternative to ballot placement in
either the general election 9 7 or both the general and primary elections; 98
in two states, payment of a fee is an absolute requirement for office. 9
Thus, in two states it is clear that the fee is charged for the chance to
run for office in any manner. In the other eleven states the fee is
charged for name placement on the ballot-the chance to run for
office in a particular way. Whether such fee schemes should be per-
mitted to stand under Turner's application of the equal protection
clause depends upon the state's interests asserted to justify the imposi-
tion of fees.
The state's interest in assuring that only "serious" candidates be
permitted to run for public office, while legitimate, in no way justifies
the imposition of qualifying fees. First, a candidate's seriousness is
certainly not a function of his ability to pay a fee. Clearly, some
prospective, serious candidates will be rich and others poor. Thus, not
all serious candidates will qualify to run and, indeed, it is probable that
some serious candidates will not qualify. 00 Because a fundamental
right is involved, the Constitution simply requires the state to take
better aim. 1'
In the second place, the payment of a fee and the sanction of ex-
clusion are unnecessary to promote this interest. A particular means
is not necessary for achieving a particular goal if an alternative can
achieve the same goal. Thus, if "serious" means having a certain
degree of support, a nominating petition requirement furthers this
objective at least as well as a fee scheme and, because it is a viable
alternative,0 2 makes the fee unnecessary. A nominating petition, con-
taining signatures from a certain percentage of the qualified voters,
meets the state's need by screening out frivolous candidates while
96 See Appendix infra.
97 Id. Georgia and Florida are 2 of these states.
98 Id.
99 d. These states are Hawaii and Ohio. Although Ohio permits write-in
votes, write-in candidates must pay a fee. Id. Thus, Ohio, like Hawaii, charges a
fee for the chance to run for office. It is questionable whether Ohio can assert any
interest sufficient to justify such a write-in fee that contributes to an absolute fee
scheme. Assuming that financing the cost of counting write-in votes is legitimate,
tax revenues serve this purpose and are less restrictive. See text following note 103
infra.
100 The classification is thus both underinclusive and overinclusive. See Tussman
& tenBroek, supra note 28, at 352-53. The overinclusive elements are probably the
least defensible since while the class of noncandidates includes poor, nonserious candi-
dates, whom by hypothesis the legislature has the right to exclude, that class also
includes poor, serious candidates. See id. 351. The class of noncandidates is also
underinclusive because rich, nonserious candidates are permitted to run.
101 See Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346, 364 (1970); Kramer v. Union Free
School Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 632 (1969).
102 It should be noted that 15 states apparently feel that the petition alternative
sufficiently promotes their interests to use it exclusively. See Appendix infra.
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making the candidate's access to the ballot a function of his political
support. Moreover, requiring a petition does not inhibit political asso-
ciation and expression but, because the candidate and his supporters
must go to the public to argue issues, the petition alternative actually
encourages valuable political activity.
The state's interest in using a qualifying fee scheme to accom-
modate its voting machinery presents somewhat different problems.
The issue becomes whether the state may restrict the number of names
appearing on the ballot to accommodate the machines it already has or,
put a different way, whether to save the expense of, perhaps, construct-
ing new machines, the state may constitutionally restrict the size of the
ballot on the basis of ability to pay a fee.
First, it is clear that the state does not have an unlimited right to
restrict the size of the ballot.113 Secondly, assuming that the state can,
to some extent, constitutionally limit ballot size, the use of qualifying
fees is not compelling nor is the exclusion of nonpaying candidates
necessary to promote this interest, since the nominating petition is ar
equally effective means to achieve the same goal and restricts on a basis
that is clearly related to the purpose of candidacy. As far as the state
is concerned in having a limited ballot, any requirement that limits the
number of candidates should be sufficient. It is clear that the qualifying
fee serves this purpose. But the nominating petition serves this purpose
equally well and at the same time uses as its criterion the only measure
that makes sense in the American political system: the popularity of,
and potential votes behind, a political aspirant.
Similarly, as to the state interest in defraying the cost of the par-
ticular election, fees and exclusion for nonpayment are not necessary,
nor is the interest sufficiently compelling to justify the burdens imposed
on voters and candidates. Elections benefit the public in its entirety,
and by legitimizing the transfer of power, serve to preserve the political
ordering of the lives of the citizenry. Singling out prospective can-
didates to bear more of this burden than do the average taxpayers is
indefensible. Instead, because alternative means are available to achieve
the state goal, the qualifying fee cannot be used for this purpose.
Although an absolute fee requirement unconstitutionally burdens
protected interests, the nominating petition would be constitutional as
an absolute requirement either for running for office in any manner or
for name placement on the ballot.
First, a nominating petition effectively achieves many of the state
goals that the courts have erroneously found to be supported by the
qualifying fee schemes. Reflecting the state's legitimate interest in re-
stricting the size of the ballot to minimize confusion, accommodate
voting machinery, and avoid the damage to the voting process that an
unlimited ballot might otherwise cause, the nominating petition demands
a showing of support as a prerequisite to ballot placement. At the same
103 Cf. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
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time, the nominating petition insures that only "serious," well-supported
candidates will gain access in terms of a criterion relevant to American
politics-voter support.
Secondly, although a qualifying fee requirement is designed to
achieve the same goal, its purpose is effected by means of a monetary
exaction that arbitrarily discriminates between rich and poor while
burdening constitutional rights. A nominating petition does not neces-
sarily have the same effect. While meeting a petition requirement may
involve cost, it does not require payment of money. Thus, although a
wealthy candidate can pay for the circulation of his petition, a poor
candidate can enlist the aid of his supporters in a campaign for sig-
natures. While it may be argued that since time is money, the poor
candidate ought, in theory at least, be able to raise the money for a
qualifying fee as easily as he can the time required to obtain signatures,
in fact it is more likely that his poor supporters will have the time but
not the money to invest in their candidate's campaign.
B. Absolute Fee Requirement for Name Placement on the Ballot
On the other hand, as to those states that provide a write-in route
to the office, for which no fee is required, it would seem that the state
is selling name placement on the ballot and not merely the only chance
to become an officeholder. In effect, however, selling name placement
on the ballot is tantamount to selling the only real chance to win the
election, a fact one can verify by consulting common empirical studies
of voting patterns.'
As a simple matter of fairness, a write-in alternative can never be
constitutionally sufficient to justify a fee scheme:
[E]ven where operative, the write-ins are no substitute for
a place on the ballot.
To force a candidate to rely on write-ins is to burden him
with disability. It makes it more difficult for him to get
elected, and for the voters to elect him.- 5
Because of this disability, the election winner's victory cannot be
explained in terms of greater popularity. It is necessary to explain his
victory in terms of the inherent difficulty of electing a write-in can-
didate. Moreover, because a write-in candidate's name does not appear
104 On one level it is clear that it is more difficult for the write-in voter to
remember a name and properly fill in his ballot than for another voter to pull a
lever beside a printed name. In this regard, it is interesting to note that, at least in
federal elections, few write-in votes are cast. Thus, in the 1968 senatorial elections,
of 50,693,952 votes cast, only 14,163 were for write-in candidates. Of these, 14,118
came from Alaska. FACTUAL CAMPAIGN INFORMATION 11 (1970) (compiled by the
Senate Library). In the 1968 presidential election, of 73,026,831 votes cast, only
2,645 were write-ins. Id. 13. This small number is probably a result of both the
mechanical difficulty of casting a write-in ballot and the voter's natural wish to vote
for a candidate who, he thinks, has a chance of winning. See J. CoaRR & H. ABRA-
HAM, ELEMENTS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 292 (4th ed. 1964).
105 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 37 (1968) (separate opinion of Douglas, J.).
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on the ballot, it stretches the word to call this provision a viable
"alternative" to name placement.106 The state simply provides no
alternative, in the sense of a sufficient substitute, when it gives the fee-
paying candidate a place on the ballot and gives the candidate who does
not pay the fee nothing but the promise to count his votes.
Because, in effect, a fee scheme conditioning name placement on
the ballot upon payment of a fee is functionally equivalent to a scheme
that requires all prospective candidates to pay a fee, it should be treated
constitutionally as such and struck down, simply by application of
Turner to fee requirements.
C. Fee Requirement for Political Party Label
The analysis thus far has proceeded on the assumption that the
particular qualifying fee scheme requires payment as an absolute re-
quirement either to ballot placement or to the chance to run at all.
While thirteen states make fees such an absolute requirement, 1' 7
another eighteen states require fees only of primary candidates.'
Prospective candidates may, thus, gain name placement on the ballot as
independents without paying a fee. Any of these eighteen states might
argue that although fees are required of some candidates (those who
desire to run in a political party primary), there is no absolute bar to
name placement on the general ballot, and, thus, the electoral scheme,
taken as a whole, provides sufficient access to the electorate. The
important issue is, however, whether the state may restrict by means
of a monetary fee the opportunity to run in a party primary, regardless
of whether the door to independent candidacy is open.
Primaries are, of course, like any other form of state action subject
to the fourteenth amendment's requirement of equal protection. 0 9 This
subjection does not mean, however, that there are no relevant dis-
tinctions between the primary and the general election. Thus, it can be
argued that the equal protection clause invalidates state action that
106 In addition, some states require write-in candidates to pay the same fee as
other candidates. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CoDE ANN. §§3513.10, .26.1 (Page Supp.
1970). In such cases, of course, the write-in cannot be considered an alternative to
paying the fee for ballot placement.
107 See Appendix htfra.
1osId. Thus, 31 states require fees of some kind. It is interesting to note that
while 18 states require fees only of primary candidates, no state requires fees only
of independents. Obviously, these 18 states are charging for the opportunity to run
in the primary-the chance to win party endorsement and carry the party label on
the general ballot. It should also be noted that Kansas, Michigan, Oklahoma, and
New Hampshire are not included in this group of states because they do not require
the payment of a fee but merely provide a fee mechanism as an alternative to other
qualification requirements. See Appendix infra.
109 See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 664 (1944):
When primaries become a part of the machinery for choosing officials, state
and national, . . . the same tests to determine the character of discrimination
or abridgement should be applied to the primary as are applied to the general
election.
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places a price on both the primary and general election ballot precisely
because such a fee scheme effectively bars from running at all candidates
who do not pay." This absolute bar exists because any candidate
whose name appears on the general ballot will have had to pay a fee,
and not because of the primary fee alone. Moreover, since the primary
is only a preliminary step to placement on the general ballot, being
barred from the primary ballot does not foreclose the chance to run for
election and win as an independent. And, since the only reason to apply
the equal protection clause in the fee context is to protect the rights of
candidates and voters, that clause should not apply when the right to
run, and the right to vote, may be exercised in the general election.
Moreover, it can be argued that additional state interests distinguish
further the primary from the general election.
The fallacies of this reasoning, however, are apparent from the
facts it assumes. Clearly, the rights of candidates and voters are not
always adequately protected by an open candidacy provision. First, the
primary is not simply a preliminary step to the general election ballot.
Instead, in a country whose politics are organized along party lines,"'
the primary is an integral part of the entire electoral process. Because
of universal suffrage and the great variety of diverse opinions held by
members of the electorate, parties serve the essential function of organiz-
ing voters into majorities behind candidates and their programs."'
This function of organization is also essential to the efficiency, indeed
management, of government because it leads to the concentration of
power that makes possible the carrying out of policy.'" The primary
is part and parcel of this entire process because through it the electorate
determines who the party candidates will be.
Secondly, with party nomination come many advantages. On
one level, the party's standard bearer derives advantage from the
party's organization, its funds, its workers, its campaign literature,
110 Under this reasoning the result would be similar in a scheme that requires
fees only of those whose names appear on the general ballot. (No state does this.)
Thus, under such a scheme although primary candidates will not as such be required
to pay, the primary winner, to get his name on the general ballot, will have to pay
the fee. Such a scheme means that one who cannot pay the fee must enter the
primary, since by hypothesis only in that election is no fee required. But, if he wins,
the candidate will have to pay a general election fee to get his name on the general
ballot. Either he cannot and does not pay it, or the party must pay it for him.
Thus, he is in the same situation as persons in a state that requires fees of both
primary and independent candidates. Under the earlier analysis, it is unconstitutional
for the state to place an absolute monetary bar in front of the candidate, which is
exactly what a general fee such as this one does. Moreover, the situation does not
change merely because here the candidate may get into the party and because the party
can pay the fee for him. It may be unconstitutional for the state to leave him only the
alternative of joining the party to get on the ballot-perhaps this infringes upon his
right to freedom of association.
11 See A. SINDLER, PoLIIcAL PARTIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1966) ; S. Lisar,
POLITICAL MAN 303-31 (Anchor ed. 1963).




and its name. 1 4 On another level, a party candidate does in fact have
the best chance of winning the election because he is known as the party
candidate." 5 In some states the particular primary may be the only
election worth running or voting in since the party nominee will win
the election."' In other states, more closely approximating the ideal
of two-party theory, the chances are still high that one of the two major
party candidates will win,. 7 although the election of a particular party's
candidate is not assured.
The question, then, is on what basis may the state distribute this
advantage? In those states in which a particular party candidate is
assured of election, the right to vote effectively," 8 the right to asso-
ciate," 9 and the right not to be barred as a candidate on an unconstitu-
tional basis can only be protected by invalidating primary fees regardless
of the presence of an independent candidacy provision, because the real
determination of who the officeholder will be is made at the primary and
not the general election. In other states, the great advantage that party
nomination provides, not in terms of assuring election, but in terms of
giving party candidates a significant edge over independents, also mili-
tates in favor of requiring the state to show compelling reasons to
1141d. 296; see D. BALMER, FINANCING STATE SENATE CAMPAIGNS: MULT-
NOMAH COUNTY, OREGON, 1964, at 11-12 (1964). The state sometimes becomes even
more directly involved, as when it makes available to party candidates public patronage
employees for campaigning purposes. See Shakman v. Democratic Organization of
Cook County, 435 F.2d 267 (7th Cir. 1970).
11 5 See generally J. CORRY & H. ABRA-HAm, supra note 104, at 291-93.
116 If such is the case, then, in that particular state, independency is no alternative
at all. See C. EwING, PRIMARY FLE ONS IN THE SOUTH-A STUDY IN UNIPARTY
PoLnIcs (1953). This study indicates that in the relevant general elections no real
decisions were made, and that in party primaries the voters were actually selecting
public officials. In such a situation, the citizen cannot forego the privilege of party
membership and still remain an active voter. Thus, the only chance he will have to
vote effectively is in the primary.
In his concurring opinion to Carter v. Dies, 321 F. Supp. 1358, 1363 (N.D. Tex.
1970), Judge Thornberry analyzed a primary fee, taking these factors into account.
Because the fee was an absolute requirement for placement on the primary ballot
and because party nomination is, at least in Texas, "tantamount to election," he
viewed the fee as a direct burden on the right to vote effectively. Id. at 1363-64.
Moreover, it is apparent that he was not referring to the right to vote effectively in
the primary, but the right to have an effective vote in determining who will win the
election.
117 Although it is difficult to prove from available statistical information that
independents and minor party candidates have little chance to win elections, in the
past they have not been very successful. Even in federal elections in which the
uniparty politics of some states is beginning to show signs of crumbling, see
M. JEWELL, LEGISLAXIVE REPRESENTATION IN THE CONTEMPORARY SOUTH 109, 123
(1967), it is apparent that either Republicans or Democrats normally win. For
instance, there has never been an independent or minor party president. See CON-
GRESSIONAL QUARTERLY SPEcIAL REPORT-PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES FROM 1788-1964
(1964). Moreover, very few independent or minor party members have sat in
Congress. See FACTUAL CAMPAIGN INFORMATION 7 (1970) (compiled by the Senate
Library). Similarly all governors are either Democrats or Republicans. Id. 15.
118 See Carter v. Dies, 321 F. Supp. 1358 (N.D. Tex. 1970), in which the court
based its holding that the general fee involved violated the equal protection clause
on the rights of voters and not candidates, and, in fact, on this basis distinguished
Wetherington. Id. at 1362-63.
19 See id. at 1363 (Thornberry, J., concurring).
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justify the necessity of primary fees."2 This does not mean that can-
didates have an absolute constitutional right to access to a political
primary; rather, because exclusion from the party primary denies to
associational groups, voters, and candidates a real shot at election,
candidates from the class of those "injured" by fee requirements do
have a federal constitutional right to be considered by the voters for
the normal, and in many instances the only realistic, chance to reach
public office without the burden of invidiously discriminatory dis-
qualifications."2
Again the state can show no compelling interest. Assuming that
financial support of political parties is a legitimate state interest, fund
raising can be accomplished by less restrictive means.2 Thus, ex-
cluding nonpaying, prospective candidates is not necessary to fulfill the
state goal. 3 Similarly, all other valid state interests can be effectively
served by less restrictive means. Accommodating voting machines and
permitting voters a narrower than infinite choice of candidates is well
served by any method that does not permit every candidate ballot place-
ment. A nominating petition requirement would serve not only those
state interests, but would also demonstrate the candidate's support.
While courts should tread lightly when asked to tell the legislature how
to spend its money,' it is also clear that the legislature, having made
its choice, should be required to choose means consistent with the
fourteenth amendment. A primary fee scheme, thus, fares little better
under equal protection analysis than a fee scheme that absolutely bars
nonpaying candidates.
CONCLUSION
This Comment has analyzed the constitutionality of three kinds of
qualifying fee schemes: those that require fees of all prospective can-
didates, regardless of the particular route to office they have chosen;
those that condition name placement on the ballot upon payment of a
fee; and those that require fees only of those who desire to run in a
party primary. Absolute fee schemes are unconstitutional because, in
effect, they require a fee for the chance to run for office. Under recent
Supreme Court cases, such a fee cannot be permitted to stand. The
other fee schemes, on the other hand, require fees not for the opportunity
to run for public office, but for the opportunity to seek that office along
a particular route that the state has provided-with name placement on
the ballot or through the primary system. Because in each situation the
120 See Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 37 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring);
cf. Spillers v. Slaughter, 325 F. Supp. 550 (M.D. Fla. 1971).
-121 See text accompanying notes 55-88 supra.
122 See Carter v. Dies, 321 F. Supp. 1358, 1361-62 (N.D. Tex. 1970).
123 See Appendix infra.
124 See Note, Discrimination. Against the Poor and the Fourteenth Amendment,
81 HAv. L. REv. 435, 440-41 (1967).
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state is providing a route of great advantage in terms of the chance to
win the election, and because each scheme affects the constitutionally
protected interests of voters and associations as well as the interests of
individual candidates and the overall political system, they, too, must fall.
These fee schemes fall, however, not because of their restrictive
nature, but because of the nature of the criterion by which they restrict.
Although the state has legitimate interests in restricting access to the
ballot and to the electorate, when protected interests are burdened in
the context of the political process, the state must be prohibited from
making grossly overinclusive classifications among its citizens. Thus,
fee schemes must be struck down. In this context courts, although re-
luctant to impose their views upon state legislatures, must, at least,
require the state to choose the least restrictive means to achieve a par-
ticular legitimate end. Only in this way can the interests of all-voters,
candidates, parties, and the state-be adequately protected.
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APPENDIX
The following table describes the election procedures of the fifty
states with respect to fee and petition requirements and the availability
of write-in provisions. The data on which the table and the footnotes
are based generally relate to major offices: President, United States
Senator, United States Representative, Governor, State Senator, and
State Representative.
The table is first divided into primary and general election cat-
egories. Primary requirements apply to prospective candidates for
party nomination, while general election requirements apply to inde-
pendents. In addition, some states, as noted in the footnotes where
relevant, provide that minor parties may nominate by convention. These
nominated candidates gain name placement on the general ballot without
having run in a primary, and in many cases must meet the independent
requirements.
Under both the primary and general election categories the table
indicates whether there is a fee requirement, a petition requirement, or
both. Each requirement is described in terms of whether it is an ab-
solute requirement (abs.) for gaining placement on that particular
ballot or merely an alternative means (alt.) for gaining such placement.
Thus, an X under "general fee absolute" means that to gain placement
on the general ballot, an independent must pay a fee.
To determine whether a fee or petition is required for name place-
ment on the general ballot for both party and independent candidates,
the reader must look under both the primary and general election cat-
egories. Every state automatically provides name placement on the
general ballot for the primary winner; thus, he does not have to meet
any additional requirement. But, if primary candidates must pay a
primary fee and independents must pay a general fee, then from the
prospective candidate's point of view, in order to gain name placement
on the general ballot, he must pay a fee, whether payment be specifically
to enter the primary or to enter the general election. In this sense,
everyone whose name appears on the general ballot had to have paid
a fee at one time or another.
The write-in categories show whether the state permits voters in
the particular election to vote for candidates other than those listed on
the printed ballot; from a prospective candidate's viewpoint, a write-in
provision means that for the particular election, he does not have to
gain name placement on the ballot to run for election. By looking at
the primary, general, and write-in categories, the reader can determine
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whether a particular requirement is an absolute prerequisite for running
for office. Thus, if both primary and independent candidates must pay
a fee and there is no write-in provision, the fee is then an absolute re-
quirement for the chance to run for office in the sense that no one can
be elected without paying a fee. On the other hand, the presence of a
write-in provision would mean that payment of a fee is not an absolute
requirement for the opportunity to run for office.
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Alabama I X X X
Alaska 2 X X X
Arizona 3  X X X X
Arkansas 4  X X X X X
California 5 X x x x
Colorado 6 X X X X
Connecticut 7  X X X x
Delaware 8 X X
Florida 9  X X X X
Georgia 10  X X X X
Hawaii 11 X X X X
Idaho 12  X X X X X X
Illinois 13 X X X X
Indiana ' 4  X X
Iowa 15  X X X X
Kansas 16  X X X X
Kentucky 17  X X x x
Louisiana 1 8  X X X
Maine 19  X X X X
Maryland 20  X X X
Massachusetts 2' X X X X
Michigan 2 2  X X X X X
Minnesota 23 X X X
Mississippi 24 X X
Missouri 25 X X X
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&ontana 2 6  X X X X
Tebraska 2 7  X X X X X
Tevada 2 8  X X
Tew Hampshire 2 9  X X X X X
Tew Jersey 3o X X X X
Tew Mexico 3 1  X X X
Tew York 3 2  X X X X
Torth Carolina 3 3  X X X X
Torth Dakota 3 4  X X X X
)ho 3 5 X X X X X X
)klahoma 36 X X
Iregon 3 7  X X X X X X
'ennsylvania 3 8  X X X X X X
bode Island 3 9  X X X
outh Carolina 40  X X X
Duth Dakota 4 1  X X
ennessee 4 2  X X X X
exas 4 3  X X X X
tah 4 4  X X X X X
ermont 45  X X X X
irginia 46 X X X X
'ashington 47  X X X X
"est Virginia 4 8  X X X X
isconsin 49 X X X X
"yoming8 O X X X X X
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1 AA. CODE tit. 17, §§ 348 (party assessment), 145 (general petition), 162
(general write-in) (1959). Like some other states, Alabama does not set fees by
statute, but instead delegates to the parties the power to charge fees. Such fees are
here called "assessments."
2 ALASKA STAT. §§ 15.25.050 (primary fee), .140-.190 (general petition). 15.030
(5) (general write-in) (1971).
3 Apiz. IEv. STAT. ANN. §§ 16-303 to -305 (primary petition), -601 (general
petition), -571C (primary write-in), -844G (general write-in) (Supp. 1971).
4ARK. STAT. ANN. §§3-109 (party assessment), -120(e), (f) (general fee),
-105(c) (general petition), -114 (primary write-in), -613(k) (general write-in)
(Supp. 1969).
5 CAL. EIECTIONS CODE §§ 6552, 6554 (primary fees) (West Supp. 1971), 6800,
6831 (general petition), 6555 (primary write-in), 14,412 (general write-in) (West
1961).
6 CoLO. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 49-6-7 (primary petition), -7-1 (general petition),
-8-6(5) (primary write-in), -11-7(7) (general write-in) (1963).
7 CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-400 (primary petition & fee) (Supp. 1971); Public
Act No. 806 (Conn. Legislative Service 1081) (general petition) (1971); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 9-265 (general write-in) (Supp. 1971). Although party-endorsed
candidates automatically win primary ballot placement, id. §§ 9-382, -416 (1967), this
table describes the primary fee and petition requirements as absolutes. This is true
as well with the general ballot. Because the party endorses only 1 candidate, calling
these requirements absolute more accurately reflects the situation of prospective
candidates.
8 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 15, §§ 3104 (party assessment), 4502 (general write-in)
(Supp. 1970). In Delaware apparently the only way to get on the general ballot is
through the primary; thus, fees are an absolute requirement both for running in the
primary and for running in the general election. The fee which the party may set
is limited to a maximum of 3% of the total salary for the entire term of office.
Id. § 3104. Candidates for the United States Senate would have to pay a maximum
of $7,650.
9 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 99.092 (primary fee & party assessment), .152, .153 (general
petition & fee), 101.011(2) (general write-in) (Supp. 1971). The filing fee for
both primary candidates and independents is 3% of the annual salary of the office
sought; in addition, the party may assess each primary candidate an additional 2%
of the annual salary. Moreover, for checking signatures on petitions, Florida charges
100 per name. Since the petition requirement for statewide offices is 5% of the
state's registered voters, id. § 99.152, and since Florida has approximately 2,765,000
registered voters, see INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC 1971, at 127 (1970), each
independent will be required to pay $13,825 for having signatures checked. The total
amount that a candidate for the United States Senate, for instance, will have to pay
both in fees and in having his petition checked is, therefore, $15,100.
10 GA. CODE ANN. §§ 34-1013 (primary & general fee), -1010 (general petition),
-1103(b) (general write-in) (1970).
11 HAWAII REv. LAws §§ 12-6 (primary fee), -3, -5 (primary petition) (Supp.
1970). Sections 12-2 and 12-41 require independents, subject to the same fee and
petition requirements, to run in a nonpartisan primary.
12 IDAHO CODE §§ 34-604 to -615, -701 (primary fee & petition), -604 to -615
(general fee & petition), -702 (primary write-in), -906 (general write-in) (Supp.
1970). Independents must file for a party primary. Id. § 34-703. Primary write-in
candidates must pay a fee. Id. § 34-702.
13 ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 46, §§ 7-10, 8-8 (primary petition), 10-3 (general petition),
7-46 (primary write-in) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1970), 24-14, 24-16 (general write-in)
(Smith-Hurd 1964); see Sanner v. Patton, 155 Ill. 553, 40 N.E. 290 (1895) (state
constitutional right to write-in candidate's name).
14 IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 29-3801 (general petition) (Supp. 1971), -5023 (general
write-in) (1969). Primary petitions are required of Presidential candidates. Id.
§ 29-3619. For other offices nominations are made either by primary or convention;
candidates face no requirements.
3 IowA CODE §§ 43.11 to .22 (primary petition) (Supp. 1971), 45.1 (general
petition), 43.66 (primary write-in) (1949), 49.99 (general write-in) (Supp. 1971).
16KAN. STAT. ANN. §§25-206 (primary fee), -205 (primary petition), -303
(general petition), -602 (general write-in) (Supp. 1969). A primary write-in is
provided only if no other candidate has filed a petition or paid a fee. Id. § 25-213.
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17Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. §§119.050 (primary petition), .250 (primary fee),
118.080 (general petition), 118.280 (general write-in) (1969). For consistency, al-
though § 119.050 requires only affidavits of two electors, it is here considered to be
a nominal petition requirement. The filing fee is only $1. The general petition is
an alternative since § 118.090 permits minor party candidates to enter the general
election without running in the primary or filing a petition.
18 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§18:310, :314 (primary fee), :624 (general petition),
:732 (general write-in) (1969). Louisiana actually is in a class unto itself, requiring
a $500 fee before the election if a candidate wishes his general election write-in votes
counted. Id. § 18:732. In terms of the textual analysis this would probably fit best
the case where no write-in is available; the general election is not fee regulated and
the primary-fee-only analysis seems appropriate.
19 ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 441 (primary petition), 491 (general petition),
701 (primary write-in), 702 (general write-in) (1964).
20 MD. ANN. CODE art. 33, §§ 4A-6 (primary fee), 7-1 (general petition), 14-1,
17-5 (general write-in) (1971).
21 MAss. ANN. LAws ch. 53, §§ 44 (primary petition), 6 (general petition), 3
(primary write-in), ch. 54, §42 (general write-in) (1971). The primary petition is
an alternative because ballot placement for state-wide office can be gained by receiving
at least 20% of the vote at a state convention.
22 MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. §§ 168.550 (primary fee), .542 (primary petition),
.685 (general petition), .572 (primary write-in), .706 (general write-in) (1967).
The primary fee and petition are alternatives for state senators and representatives.
This alternative of paying a fee is not open to state executive offices, United States
Congressmen, and United States Senators. For them the petition is an absolute
requirement.
23 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 202.05 (primary fee) (Supp. 1971), .09 (general peti-
tion), 203.51, 204.10 (general write-in) (1962).
24 MISS. CODE ANN. §§3120 (primary fee) (Supp. 1971), 3269 (general write-in)
(1957). Apparently only through a primary can anyone have his name printed on
the ballot. Compare Allen v. State Bd. of Elec., 393 U.S. 544 (1969) (holding
Miss. CODE ANN. § 3260 could not be amended to raise number of signatures required
on petition unless in compliance with Voting Rights Act of 1965), with Miss. CODE
ANN. § 3260 (Supp. 1971) (deleting nominating petition alternative).
25 Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 120.350 (primary fee) (Supp. 1970), .180 (general petition),
121.110 (general write-in) (1966).
26 MONT. REv. CODES ANN. §§ 23-3304 (primary fee), -3318 (general petition),
-3304 (primary write-in), -3606(4) (general write-in) (Supp. 1971). The general
write-in is not available when voting machines will not accommodate it, id. § 23-3805
(1), but is available when electronic voting systems are used. Id. §23-3904(4).
27 NEB. REv. STAT. §§ 32-513 (primary fee), -504 (general petition & fee), -428
(primary write-in), -428 (general write-in) (1968).
28 NEv. REv. STAT. §§ 293.177, .193 (primary fee), .200 (general petition) (1963).
20 N.H. REv. STAT. A-N. §§56:14 (primary fee), :15, :18 (primary petition),
:65, :67 (general petition), :47 (primary write-in), 59:59 (general write-in) (1971).
30 NJ. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:23-5 (primary petition), :13-1 (general petition),
:23-16, -25 (primary write-in), :15-28 (general write-in) (1964).
31 N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 3-8-26 (primary fee), -8-2 (1970) as amended, .(Supp.
1971), -8-3 (general petition), -12-36 (general write-in) (19705.
32 N.Y. Er.EcTioN LAw §§ 134 (primary petition) (McKinney 1964), 138 (general
petition) (McKinney Supp. 1971), 212 (primary & general write-in) (McKinney
1964).
33 N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 163-120 (primary fee), -152 (general petition), -175(3)
(primary & general write-in) (1964).
34 N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 16-04-02 (primary petition) (1960), -03-02 (general
petition) (Supp. 1971), -04-28 (primary write-in), -12-06 (general write-in) (1960).
3 Onio REV. CODE ANY. §§ 3513.10 (primary fee), .05 (primary petition), .26.1
(general fee), .25.7, .25.8 (general petition) (Page Supp. 1970), .23 (primary write-
in) (1960), .04.1 (general write-in) (Supp. 1970). In Ohio those who desire to run
as write-in candidates must also pay a fee. Id. § 3513.10.
36 OrA. STAT. ANN. tit. 26, § 161 (primary fee or petition) (Supp. 1971).
Candidates must either present a petition or submit a fee, which the candidate forfeits
if his performance in the election is below a given standard. Id. The fee is $1500
for gubernatorial candidates and $200 for statewide offices. Id.
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37 ORE. Ray. STAT. §§ 249.271 (primary fee), .020(1), .041 (1) (primary petition),
.271 (general fee), .710, .740 (general petition), .354(4) (primary write-in), 250.110
(4) (general write-in) (1969).
38 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 25, §§ 2873 (primary fee), 2867, 2872 (primary petition),
2914 (general fee), 2911 (general petition), 2962(b) (primary write-in), 2963(e)
(general write-in) (1963).
39 R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 17-14-7 (primary petition), -16-1 to -3 (general
petition), -19-31 (general write-in) (1970).
40 S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 23-400.74 (primary fee), .16 (general petition), .17 (general
write-in) (Supp. 1970).
41 S.D. ComPILED LAWS ANN. §§ 12-6-4 (Supp. 1971), -6-5 to -6-8 (primary
petition), -7-1 to -7-4 (general petition) (1967). Certain minor party nominations
may be made by convention. Id. § 12-5-21.
42 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 2-811, -812 (primary petition), -1206 (general petition),
-1207 (general & primary write-in) (1971 Repl. Vol.).
43 TEX. ELECTION CODE arts. 13.07a, .08a, .15, .16 (primary fee and assessment),
(Supp. 1971), .50 (general petition) (1967), .09 (primary write-in), 6.05(3), :06
(general write-in) (Supp. 1971). Only prospective candidates who run in major
party primaries must pay a fee. Smaller parties are permitted to nominate by con-
vention, and thus minor party candidates do not have to pay a fee. Id. arts. 13.45,
.47, .47a (Supp. 1971). The primary write-in is illusory since it only permits write-in
votes for certain party offices. Id. art. 13.09.
44 UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 20-3-14 (primary & general fee), -3-38 (general petition),
-3-11,' -3-20 (primary wvrite-in), -7-5 (general write-in) (1953). Only the 2 candi-
dates receiving the largest number of votes at a party convention are eligible for name
placement on the primary ballot, and if one candidate receives 70% of the convention
vote, he becomes the party's nominee and no primary election is held for that office.
Id. § 20-4-9 (Supp. 1971).
45 VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §§ 334-37 (primary petition), 573 (general petition)
362 384 (primary write-in), 801, 1043 (general write-in) (1968). The general
petition requirement applies only to independents, since minor party candidates may
gain general ballot placement by convention nomination. Id. §§ 571-75.
46 VA. CODE ANN. §§ 24.1-198 (primary fee), -185 (primary petition), -168
(general petition), -217 (general write-in) (Supp. 1971).
47 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 29.18.050 (primary fee), .24.070 (minor party
fee), .51.170 (primary & general write-in) (1965). Washington does not explicitly
provide a route to name placement for independents. Although prospective candidates
may enter a major party primary and, thereby, attempt to gain general election ballot
placement, minor parties nominate by convention. Id. § 2924.020. These candidates
must also pay a fee. Id. § 29.24.070. Thus, everyone whose name appears on the
general ballot will have had to pay a fee. Minor party nomination must be evidenced
by a certificate of nomination issued by the minor party convention. Id. § 29.24.040.
48 W. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 3-5-8 (primary fee), -5-23 (general fee & petition),
-6-5 (general write-in) (1971). The general petition is not quite absolute since minor
party candidates nominated by convention and not by primary may gain general ballot
placement by paying the fee. Id. § 3-5-22, -8. Independents must pay a fee and submit
a petition to gain general ballot placement. Id. § 3-5-23.
49 Wis. STAT. ANN. §§ 8.15 (primary petition), .20 (general petition), .16 (pri-
mary write-in), 5.64(1) (a) (general write-in) (1967).
50 Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 22-118.16 (primary fee), .10, .11 (general petition), .13
(general fee), .21 (primary write-in), .83 (general write-in) (Supp. 1971). The
general write-in provision does not apply to candidates for state legislature. Id.
§ 22-118.83.
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